Thoughts & Things on European and International Affairs.
In this blog you will find links, articles and brief comments on issues related to the European Union, International & EU law and International affairs & politics.
6th Global Administrative Law Seminar, Viterbo, June 11-12, 2010
Presentation, provisional program and call for papers
The Financial Crisis
and
the Global Regulatory Governance
1. Overview
The basic models of market regulation that have prevailed during the XX century had been forged in reaction to the crisis of 1929. The responses given to that economic emergency, initially conceived as transient, have deeply shaped the relations between the market and the State for more than fifty years. In the United States, the New Deal has immensely expanded the reach of the public regulatory powers in economic and social matters and has led to the introduction of new modes of interaction between the citizens and the agencies through the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act. Similarly, in Europe, the crisis has expanded the programs of public assistance and the instruments of central planning, thereby subjecting the market to a significant State control.
At the international level, the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF, WTO, World Bank) were created after WWII to address various structural aspects of the 1929 crisis as well as states’ “beggar thy neighbor” policy responses to it, and prevent a recurrence of a prolonged global depression.
In the last thirty years, widespread convergent processes of liberalization, privatization and internationalization have eroded the State control over the economy and altered the balance between the public and the private sphere. State authorities have begun to lose their centrality, to the advantage of private organisms and supranational institutions. Many aspects of state regulation have been regarded as ineffective or even counterproductive, and have been complemented or partially superseded by private law approaches, by private regulatory initiatives and/or by self-regulation.
However, the recent financial crisis has subverted the trend. States have reasserted enormous powers over the market and its actors. On one hand, the bailout of banks and financial institutions – considered “too big to fail” – has paved the way to the reintroduction of public tools to regulate and shape the economy. Some of the crucial developments concern specifically the financial sector, which is increasingly subject to regulatory scrutiny and expanded controls. . Are these tools comparable to techniques used earlier? Though designed for temporary purposes, are they destined to endure and live through the crisis, as happened after the Great Depression? What similarities are there between problems and remedies in earlier crises in different economies, including the general economic crisis which began in 1929, andthe current epoch?
. The crisis has also shown the limits of a State-centered regulatory model, inducing the national authorities to intensify their cooperation. At the same time, it has tested the ability of Bretton Woods institutions and other international and supranational consultative or regulatory regimes to deal with the crisis as such or to deal with measures taken by states to limit damage to domestic production and employment. At the global level, as in Europe and other regions, initiatives have been launched to reform the financial institutional setting and expand the reach of their powers. Just to mention one example, the Financial Stability Forum has beeninstitutionalized as Financial Stability Group, in order to fill an evident gap in global regulatory governance. How successful will this and similar attempts be? Is it possible to “redeem” the financial sector from its “vices”? Is the lack of rules the real problem? And is the regulatory system ready to take a sustained statist turn?
The 6th Viterbo Gal Conference will provide the opportunity to present advanced research projects on the financial crisis and on global regulatory measures to deal with it, including states’ domestic policy responses.. A global administrative law approach will provide the main analytical tools: accordingly, the papers should focus on the structure of the global and regional regulatory governance relating to finance, trade (including questions of state aids) and related aspects of the crisis; on the powers thereby exercised; on their effectiveness and accountability, or on critical or conceptual perspectives on these issues. Given the complexity of the subject, an interdisciplinary exchange will be favoured. Papers may, thus, also address the topic by adopting an historical, economic and/or international relations approach, and/or a legal approach. Historical approaches could include an analysis of responses to past global economic and financial crises.
2. Provisional program
The seminar will be held in Viterbo (Italy), at the TusciaUniversity, on June 11-12, 2010. Both junior and senior scholars are encouraged to submit a paper proposal. The selected papers will constituted the basis for a thoroughly discussion on the strategies and techniques adopted to tackle the crisis. The overall aim is not only to assess the consistency of the scientific categories so far adopted, but also to define working tools that may pave the way to a more effective and forward-looking regulatory reaction to the crisis.
3. Call for papers
The advisory group for the conference invites submissions of case study papers on the conference themes outlined below.
The abstract must be a minimum of 150 and no more than 500 words. The deadline for submission is December 20, 2009. Abstracts must include an indication of the major arguments to be made as well as a statement of the issue area of the paper, and they should state the proposed title for the paper, as well as the postal and email addresses and contact telephone of the author. Abstracts (in PDF, RTF or Word format) must be sent to infogal09@gmail.com. A notification of reception will be sent immediately after.
The selection panel of the conference committee will consider all abstracts received by the submission deadline and will accept the most significant in relation to the issue of the seminar. The notification for paper acceptance is due on January 20, 2010.
The submission date for the full paper is no later than May 10, 2010. The final version of the paper must be no longer than 8,000 words (footnotes included) and must be sent to ViterboGalSeminar@gmail.com(PDF, RTF or Word format).
In this month's issue of the European Law Review I have an article which examines the role and legal effect of soft law in EU external relations. Here is the abstract:
"This article examines the soft legal nature and function of the instruments constituting the European Neighbourhood Policy. [ENP] Three distinct stages in the development and execution of this policy are identified, and it is argued that these phases explain the dominant functions of soft instruments, as well as their quality as hard or soft law. In its conclusion, this article evaluates the effectiveness and legality of using soft law to conduct the ENP, and flags up the essential elements for assessing the use of soft law in EU external relations more generally."
It is available in hard-copy as well as through Westlaw: E.L. Rev. 2009, 34(5), 696-719. I'm mildly annoyed with Westlaw though, because they seem to have written their own abstract different from the one in the printed version and pasted here. While not incorrect, it's not entirely correct either. So for those of you interested in an electronic copy of my proof of the original, send me an email at bart.vanvooren[at]eui.eu; and I'll give you the nicely typeset version which appears in the hard-copy.
The Cato Institute is an independent think-tank based in Washington DC, which states that its mission is to "increase the understanding of public policies based on the principles of limited government, free markets, individual liberty, and peace." I've been quite critical of their research ever since I attended a talk of one of their fellows in 2004. In essence, the argument went that elephants should be privatized so as to protect them from poaching, and ensure they would not go extinct. Evidently that rather anecdotal example is a logical extension of the free market thinking to which the Institute's thinkers are committed. Libertarian thinking is often well-research, and quite coherent in basing itself on some of their most influential thinkers, and I do admire the libertarian movement for that. However, I thoroughly disagree with privatizing elephants, or other similar thinking, for reasons which I might explain in future posts. The reference to the Cato institute here, is because the Czech President, a professor in economics, is well-connected to this institution. Here is the link to a publication based on a speech he delivered in Spring, 2007: 'Environmentalism and other Challenges of the Current Era' The essence of the speech is an argument against "-isms", which according to Klaus are but ideologies seeking to limit freedom. He mentions "Social-democratism" as a softened version of Communism, but other such limitations include "internationalism, multiculturalism, europeism, feminism, environmentalism ..." In the article then, he heralds the Czech Republic (and himself?) as having managed to overcome Communism and successfully install a parliamentary democracy. Two immediate threats to that newly gained freedom are 'an Ever Closer Europe' as well as environmentalism. For now I shall focus on the first threat, European integration, where he includes the usual complaint about the loss of sovereignty. In the previous post on the position of the UK post-Lisbon, I already expressed my dislike for such ill-defined claims, but Klaus is more clear in stating what exactly that means: "Freedom and democracy —those two precious values— cannot be secured without parliamentary democracy within a clearly defined state territory. Yet that is exactly what the current European political elites and their fellow travelers are attempting to eliminate." On the first point, I very much agree with him, and I do think that the Commission and Council General Secretariat are bodies which huge power, and insufficient means for checking such power. However, I do consider the Lisbon Treaty in improvement in that area, due to the "Citizen's initiative" (one million signatures of citizens for a legislative initiative at EU level) as well as greater involvement of national parliaments. The UK parliament is already very strong in scrutinizing the EU, (I certainly have regularly used their published interrogations of EU officials) and I think strengthening Member States' parliaments position in this regard is an excellent development. In that sense then, I consider Klaus' last-man-standing resistance of the Lisbon Treaty rather short-sighted. Whatever the man's achievements were in standing on the barricades against Communism, it is time to move on, and nationalist claims such as those of Klaus are not helping to move Europe into the 21st century. As in the Guardian editorial I discussed a few days ago, I do indeed think that this the Czech president's resistance is yet another expression of a 20th century to nation-centered thinking, while it was exactly the point of EU integration to overcome that development that led to two World Wars. The above quoted supposed need for a "clearly defined state territory" to protect freedom is but one of the confirmations, but the Cato article also refers to "the lack of a European Demos". Sure, not many citizens feel Europeans (although I do), but that is still no argument for Klaus to ignore his own Parliament which has already approved the Treaty. Klaus used to be a strong EU-accession proponent before the 2004 enlargement, signed the accession treaty himself, at a time the EU constitution was still very much alive (!). It is not very consistent to herald oneself as a hero of Democracy, but make a U-turn on the EU, in defiance of one's own parliament, and in defiance of changes that would not just strengthen the Czech parliament, but also that of the European parliament. I tend to think that President Klaus is taking a "history will prove me right" kind of attitude, but is in fact simply acting in a way that will further damage the Czech republic after an already poor Presidency. The EU integration to which Klaus signed on in 2004 was already far beyond the "community of cooperating nations" that he would like to see emerge. Blocking the Lisbon treaty in the way that he does will not bring about such a Community, rather it is simply bad politics.
The ECPR Standing Group on the European Union is organizing its Fifth Pan-European Conference. It will be hosted by the Faculty of Economics of the University of Oporto and the University Fernando Pessoa, in Porto, Portugal, from 24 to 26 June 2010. The Standing Group's Pan-European Conference is the largest academic conference on the European Union in Europe and brings together scholars working on the European Union from all over the world.
The conference program is divided into twelve sections under the co-chairmanship of Anand Menon from University of Birmingham and Hussein Kassim from University of East Anglia. The sections and section chairs are as follows:
• Theories of European Integration chaired by Mark Pollack of Temple University. This section covers the study of European integration with particular emphasis on theory development.
• EU Institutions chaired by Andreas Maurer, German Institute for International and Security Affairs. This section covers the study of European institutions and decision making.
• The EU and the Member States, chaired by Paolo Graziano, Bocconi University. This section looks at EU-member state interaction, including not only debates about Europeanization, but how member states attempt to influence developments at EU level.
• Public Opinion, Party Politics and Interest Intermediation chaired by Sarah Binzer Hobolt at Oxford University. This section covers all aspects related to European public opinion, elections and participation in EU level policies.
• Economic and Social Policies chaired by Nicolas Jabko, CERI, Sciences Po., Paris. This section covers the study of European Union socio-economic policies.
• Environmental Governance and Climate Change chaired by Annette Bongardt, Instituto Nacional de Administração. This section covers environmental policy, including its interaction with other policy areas.
• EU Law and Politics chaired by Susanne Schmidt, University of Bremen. This section covers the study of the European Union with particular emphasis on the interactions between politics, policy, and law.
• Gender and Diversity chaired by Roberta Guerrina, University of Surrey. This section covers the study of European integration with a particular emphasis on issues of gender, identity and diversity.
• The European Union as a Global Actor chaired by Frédéric Merand, University of Montréal. This section covers all aspects related to external economic and political relations.
• Enlargement and the European Neighborhood chaired by Yannis Stivachtis, Virginia Tech. This section covers all aspects related to the politics and economics of EU enlargement.
• Immigration, Migration and Asylum chaired by Christian Joppke at the American University of Paris. This section covers all aspects related to the politics of immigration and migration in Europe, including asylum policy.
• The EU: Challenge, Crisis and Reform chaired by Dan Kelemen, Rutgers University. This section looks at the external and internal challenges confronted by the EU, and how it has responded. It assesses EU efforts at reform and considers what further changes are necessary.
The program chair will accept proposals for BOTH individual papers and whole panels (including a maximum of four papers). Proposals should be made on-line using the conference website:
Proposals for individual papers should include the name, affiliation, and contact details (including email address) for all paper authors, as well as a brief (max. 150 word) abstract and paper title.
Proposals for whole panels should include the full details for each paper (as above), plus the name, affiliation, and contact details for the panel convenor, chair, and discussant, as well as a short (max. 100 word) panel synopsis. In all cases, persons making proposals should indicate which of the conference themes they feel their proposal best addresses.
The caption under this column which appeared on Monday in The Times reads: 'The forced Yes vote in Irelandmakes it respectable to ask whether the benefits outweigh the sacrifices of staying in the EU'. Stating that 'the Irish were sandbagged by their fear of becoming another Iceland', the article continues "Britainhas not even had a first referendum, as a result of an elaborate European conspiracy. This conspiracy has changed the political question about Europemore than most politicians have yet realised. It has made the “better off out” policy a respectable part of political debate."
Previously in this blog (in the comment on the Timbro report whether EU is brainwashing its citizens towards integration) I have mentioned that I consider myself a "skeptical Europhile", committed to European integration in its economic and political facets, but skeptical of various developments. The thoughts in this post are not so much about whether the Irish were really 'sandbagged' - surely asking the same question over-and-over until you get the right answer should raise eyebrows, but rather this column is a reaction to yet another Euro-skeptic comment that sees only drawbacks and not benefits to 'Europe', but is also limited by factual ignorance.
First thing's first. As one could derive from previous posts such as the one on the Maduro Opinion in Commission v. Sweden, or my article on the small arms judgment in the foreign affairs review; I do not define integration as "communautarization", nor do I share the dream of my former prime minister Verhofstadt that we'd wake up tomorrow in a federal Europe with a European identity card only. Subsidiarity is to be taken seriously, as are the limitations imposed by the principle of conferral.
That being said, secondly, this Times column is far too dialectic in its approach to the United Kingdom in Europe. The times contribution is essentially built around two questions: "Does Europewant Britain" and "Does Britain want Europe"? Where this column refers to 'Europe', I will talk of the EU since I'm not fond of how mass media uses the geographic term to refer to a political and legal integration project, but anyway.
On the first question, the article contains rather empty references to how Britons thoroughly dislike Tony Blair as an argument against the Lisbon Treaty. According to the columnist, UK citizens would construe him taking the post of EU president as a reward for pushing through the treaty and breaking his promise in the UK to have a referendum. Surely that is not a valid argument against the essence that is the European Union? Do I think Blair would be the best choice? Not necessarily, and that is largely because of the Iraq war and the schism in European foreign policy in 2003. If he failed to take a European stance then, that should reflect negatively on his eligibility for that position. Surely the Blair candidacy also has its merits, but the point is that it is an altogether different discussion.
Furthermore, the columnist makes the claim that Europe does not want the UK because:
"There is a fundamental difference in the constitutional history of the United Kingdomand the history of the great continental powers. Francehas a Bonapartist tradition and Germanyhas a Bismarckian one. The Anglo-Saxon tradition is that of liberal democracy, hammered out in the United Kingdom after 1688 and the United Statesafter 1776. The German philosopher is Hegel; the English is Locke. in the European Union.
The British understand the American constitution, but we do not understand well the European constitutions. Nor do the Europeans understand the Anglo-Saxon concepts of liberal democracy. The European Union does not pretend to have a liberal constitution; perhaps the Lisbontreaty can best be described as an authoritarian federal bureaucracy, seeking almost unlimited powers."
It does not take a degree in philosophy or law to see that these two paragraphs are crude generalizations. The idea of the written versus unwritten constitution may be one of the starting points in an introductory course on comparative constitutionalism, but if the student would then attend the course during the whole term she/he would discover a world of nuanced jurisprudence. No need to go into constitutional differences or parallels, but for me those two paragraphs are a very expensive way of saying 'we are different from them', 'they do not understand us, and therefore we should go our separate ways'. Where that is a way of saying 'Europe does not want Britain', it is really also connected to his arguments on why 'Britain does not want Europe'. In the later part of the column, as was to be expected, 'The S-Word' props up: "the sacrifice of British sovereignty".
As always, I find calls to sovereignty rather grotesque and meaningless. For some countries they are used to justify human rights abuses and fend off any external intervention to prevent it. (For example, I have heard it used to justify FGM practices.) On other occasions it is meant to call into question whether the UK really wanted to join the EEC in the 1970's. Well, there has been ample time and treaty revisions to correct that mistake. This then reminds me of what professor Guiliano Amato said some two years ago in one of the seminars at our institution: 'The clause in the draft constitution on the option of leaving the EU was included so that this nonsense would be over once and for all, and we could say "please - go ahead".' (This is a paraphrase and not a quote!) Hence,the UK is welcome to use the new clause of the Lisbon Treaty. Do I think that would be good for the Union, no, I certainly do not and UK is an important part of the Union for so many reasons. It's just that empty calls to sovereignty will not solve the problem that the EU indeed lacks resonance with its citizenry, and that the commentator paints an all too simplistic picture of "the UK has no business in the EU". Maybe the UK wanted economic integration - so goes the article - but definitely not political integration. It then seems that the writer selectively (?) forgets that the 1998 St. Malo declaration on defence integration was initiated by France and the UK. Not Germany and France, while the author seems to assimilate those countries with the EU. That document gave the starting shot for what is presently the European Security and Defence Policy, and it seems that the UK does see the benefits of such integration. (Interoperability between European forces would greatly increase the clout of all our militaries!) Furthermore, even contemplating that the UK renegotiate its position in the WTO dealing with the US, Japan, EC and China; should cause cold shivers for any UK and/or EU businessman. It would hurt, and not just a little bit.
The point is that us-versus-them discussions/columns/blog posts/... are but empty rhetoric and demagogy, and these kinds of opinions fit in a broader dislike for 'all-things-political'. Sure, the Tories will come to power and Brown will go belly up, and the Times editors will be oh-so-happy; but after a few years the new government too will be harshly criticized in the same media. Similarly so in Belgium, where the political class has lost much credibility over the past few years with the debacle over further federalization. Such disillusionment of the populace is a serious issue, especially in harsh economic times. We should all learn lessons from history, and a return to blind nationalism is not an answer to present-day problems - and that is the essence of what this Times column proposes.
In sum, no, I don't think that the UK should leave the Union, and I do think that the basis of EU integration - economic and political - remains valid. However, do I like that the General Secretariat of the Council is as well as the Commission have so much unchecked power? No, I don't, and that should change. (And many similar examples exist). But ridiculous references to sovereignty are useless. The UK should fully take up its right place in EU integration (Join Schengen for example), and influence it for the better, shaping it so that integration does not equal blind centralization, but moves towards an intelligent new political system for the 21st century. A novel system that encompasses a larger territory with diverse traditions, that manges to take decisions at the most appropriate level, and does so in the most democratic fashion remotely possible.
Last Thursday, AG Maduro's opinion in Commission v. Sweden came out. The opinion is quite interesting for it illustrates the extent to which jurisprudence on the duty of cooperation has matured. If one recalls the early case on the Euratom treaty, and the final three paragraphs of Opinion 1/94, there were rather broad references to 'unity in international representation of the Community', which requires the EC and Member states to cooperate in a loyal fashion. That's great, but what does that mean? Several cases have thus followed, and it becomes possible to construct something of a timeline of which legal obligation arises at a given moment of mixity. The way Maduro traces the facts and duties of the Member States and the Community during the EC decision-making process is an interesting read - very much as a timeline of the life of a mixed agreement. The previous case on the duty of cooperation (C433/06 and 233/06) had already presented a similar view of what a Member State may or may not do during the negotiation process of a mixed agreement (consult and inform the commission, in what form, etc), and this opinion lengthens it during the existence of such an agreement.
It is very difficult to recap the facts any shorter than Maduro has done, and I do recommend a quick skim of the 17 short paragraphs which nicely outline what happened at which date. And those dates are indeed important, because maduro uses them to assess the 'reasonableness' of Member State action. In the end, he argued that Sweden was too fast in acting unilaterally in the exercise of its shared competence. For him, Sweden has too much pressured the internal EC decision-making process by waiting only a week between a working group meeting, and its unilateral action in the Review committee in the agreement at issue. While reading the opinion, I was skeptical, as during lecture of similar cases I have increasingly felt that there is little reciprocal about the supposedly reciprocal duty of cooperation, and that this would be yet another pro-EC duty of cooperation Opinion. The reciprocity mantra is repeated quite often in the case-law, but only very recently in Greece v. Commission was there a real substantiated hint at which that might mean. (there is also an earlier case involving the UK) Usually, the duty of cooperation is a stick to beat the Member States, rather than the Community. However, in the context of this case - and hence the importance of the facts- I do agree with the reasoning of Maduro, and he manages to very nicely strike a balance between 'EC interests' and 'Community interests.' As such, he says that sometimes "abiding by the duty of loyal cooperation may involve the sacrifice of a Member State’s interests." (55) True, but what about reciprocity? Para 57 provides the answer: "I am sympathetic to the argument that Member States must not be caught in a never-ending process, in which a final decision by the Community is postponed to the point of inaction. If that proves to be the case, a decision should be deemed to have been taken and Member States should be allowed to act. Nonetheless, that was not the case here: it is sufficient to point out that little more than a week elapsed between Sweden’s announcement that it would act individually if an agreement was not reached and its actual submission of a proposal." Hence, Sweden breached its duty of cooperation.
Today, 30 September 2009, the fact-finding mission headed by Ambassador Heidi Tagliaviniits finally published its report after quite a bit of delay. The three volumes of the report can be downloaded here. This post will look into the contents of the report as a kind of reader's digest, and has collected some responses in the media.
1. EU Mandate and Reception of the Report
According to the Council Decision of 2 December 2008, the aim of this fact-finding mission was to "investigate the origins and the course of the conflict in Georgiaincluding with regard to international law [including the Helsinki Final Act], humanitarian law and human rights, and the accusations made in that context [including the allegations of war crimes]. The geographical scope and time span of the investigation will be sufficiently broad to determine all the possible causes of the conflict. The results of the investigation will be presented to the parties to the conflict, and to the Council, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN), in the form of a report."
In the press release today the EU welcomed the presentation of this report and 'took note of its content.' While that could not be a more neutral reception of the report, it added "Underlining the independent nature of the report, the EU hopes that its findings can contribute towards a better understanding of the origins and the course of last year's conflict and, in a broader perspective, serve as an input to future international efforts in the field of preventive diplomacy." Thereafter the EU recalled that a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflicts in Georgia must be based on full respect for the principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.
So what is actually in the report, and how have Russia and Georgia responded to it?
2. Content of the Report
The report is quite long, and consists of three volumes
The first volume of the report contains introductory material such as a disclaimer that it seeks to independently verify fact, and is not a tribunal. It outlines the methodology used (questionnaires, interviews, visits to key sites, use of investigations by the Red Cross, OSCE immediately after the events, and so on...) The report further adds that "The views of the sides involved in the conflict have been widely divergent from the beginning, and appear to be getting more so as time goes by. Thus the truth seems increasingly difficult to ascertain and verify."
This volume certainly does more than present many disclaimers, and does not shun clear statements. The second subtitle of this volume is entitled 'The conflict in Georgia in August 2008' and is quite clear in presenting the course of events. Recall that Georgia accused Russia of moving forces into South-Ossetia during the night of 7 to 8 August, and Saakashvilii asserted that Georgia therefore responded in defense of its sovereignty. The report in paragraph two states that: "On the night of 7 to 8 August 2008, a sustained Georgian artillery attack struck the
town of Tskhinvali. Other movements of the Georgian armed forces targeting Tskhinvali and the surrounding areas were under way, and soon the fighting involved Russian, South Ossetian and Abkhaz military units and armed elements. It did not take long, however, before the Georgian advance into South Ossetia was stopped. In a counter-movement, Russian armed forces, covered by air strikes and by elements of its Black Sea fleet, penetrated deep into Georgia, cutting across the country’s main east-west road, reaching the port of Poti and stopping short of Georgia’s capital city, Tbilisi." After recounting the subsequent international political efforts (Sarkozy in Moscow) and the pre-history of the conflict, the report continues on 'who started it'. Para 15 continues that "The Georgian allegations of a Russian invasion were supported, inter alia, by claims of illegal entry into South Ossetia of a large number of Russian troops and armour, prior to the commencement of the Georgian operation. According to Georgian answers to the Mission´s questions, the process of building-up of Russian forces in South Ossetia had started in early July 2008, continued in the course of August and included troops and medical personnel, tents, armoured vehicles, tanks, self-propelled artillery and artillery guns. This process allegedly intensified in the night of 6 to 7 August and in the late evening of 7 August. Georgian allegations of Russian military build-up in South Ossetia prior to 8 August 2008 were denied, however, by the Russian side. According to the Russian information provided to the Mission, the first Russian units entered the territory of South Ossetia, and Russian air force and artillery began their attacks on Georgian targets at 14.30 on 8 August, i.e. immediately after the decision for an intervention was made by the leadership of the Russian Federation."
The judgment of the fact-finding mission was the following:
"The Mission is not in a position to consider as sufficiently substantiated the Georgian claim concerning a large-scale Russian military incursion into South Ossetia before 8 August 2008. However, there are a number of reports and publications, including of Russian origin, indicating the provision by the Russian side of training and military equipment to South Ossetian and Abkhaz forces prior to the August 2008 conflict. Additionally there seems to have been an influx of volunteers or mercenaries from the territory of the Russian Federation to South Ossetia through the Roki tunnel and over the Caucasus range in early August, as well as the presence of some Russian forces in South Ossetia, other than the Russian JPKF battalion, prior to 14.30 hours on 8 August 2008. Also it seems that the Russian air force started its operations against Georgian targets, including those outside South Ossetian administrative boundaries, already in the morning of 8 August, i.e. prior to the time given in the Russian official information. The Russian air force reportedly started its attacks in central Georgia (Variani, Gori), gradually extending such activities to other parts of the country, including the Senaki military base, military targets in the port of Poti and the capital of Tbilisi as well as some dual purpose 21 objects such as the Tbilisi airport radar, railroad tracks and other infrastructure and communication facilities. There are conflicting reports over whether in some instances civilian objects were hit deliberately or in terms of so-called collateral damage. The Mission found no conclusive evidence for either version. In addition to the Russian ground and air forces, the Black Sea fleet also soon engaged in the armed conflict, attacking targets on Georgian territory outside South Ossetia and providing naval cover for land operations."
Further in the report, the fact-finding mission is quite a bit less ambiguous in its conclusion: "There is the question of whether the use of force by Georgia in South Ossetia, beginning with the shelling of Tskhinvali during the night of 7/8 August 2008, was justifiable under international law. It was not. [...] It is not possible to accept that the shelling of Tskhinvali during much of the night with GRAD multiple rocket launchers (MRLS) and heavy artillery would satisfy the requirements of having been necessary and proportionate in order to defend those villages. [...]
At least as far as the initial phase of the conflict is concerned, an additional legal question is whether the Georgian use of force against Russian peacekeeping forces on Georgian territory, i.e. in South Ossetia, might have been justified. Again the answer is in the negative. There was no ongoing armed attack by Russia before the start of the Georgian operation. Georgian claims of a large-scale presence of Russian armed forces in South Ossetia prior to the Georgian offensive on 7/8 August could not be substantiated by the Mission."
On the legality of the Russian actions, the panel did not accept the defence argument:"the Russian Federation invoked the need to protect its own citizens living in South Ossetia. Under Article 61 (2) of the Russian constitution “the Russian Federation guarantees its citizens defence and patronage beyond its boundaries”. [...] In the case at hand, the action was not solely and exclusively focused on rescuing and evacuating Russian citizens, but largely surpassed this threshold by embarking upon extended military operations over large parts of Georgia. Consequently, it must be concluded that the Russian military action outside South Ossetia was essentially conducted in violation of international law."
On the matter of Human Rights law and International Humanitarian law, the panel wronged all parties finding that Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian forces all committed violations during the conflict and after the ceasefire.
The final conclusion of the report was: "The international community as well as all other regional or non-regional actors involved in the conflict should continue to make every conceivable effort to bring the sides to the negotiating table and to assist them in making arrangements in keeping with the Charter of the UN, the Helsinki Final Act of the OSCE and the relevant documents of the Council of Europe, in order to settle their differences and prevent another outbreak of hostilities. The successful outcome of such negotiations could also do much to mend relations between Western powers and Russia. There is little hope, however, for a peaceful future in the conflict region unless the two main contenders, Russia and Georgia, make bilateral efforts themselves to solve their disputes. This needs to be done now."
There is thus no doubt that the report places blame and responsibility in both camps to an equal extent, judging that Russia and Georgia acted illegally and disproportionally in all ways conceivable. So what about the governments' responses?
3. Reactions to the Report
In an article on Vesti.ru before the release of the report (03:28 Moscow Time), one finds some of the elements leaked to the press. That article states that "Georgia fired the first shot", but also quotes the report as stating that Russia has used 'excessive force' in its response. Further in the article oone can find ambassador of Russia at the EU Vladimir Chizhov stating that "the report is not a surprise to anyone". He adds that"People who take decisions in the capitals of Europe, are now well aware that this in fact occurred in August last year." Chizov also hailed the professional qualities of Mrs. Tagliavini.", but added that Russia 'does not need a report in favour of its own point of view, since Russia was objective in its assertions beforehand.' The article also quotes diplomatic sources in Brussels which assert "that the Georgian Government will have difficulties responding an answer to the report."
(google translate rules!)
I have been trying hard to find opinions from the Georgian side and they are indeed hard to come by.
1) Medianews.ge reports only the inquiry's publication, as did Civil.ge, Georgia TV
2) The Georgian times reprints a times article of yesterday which reported on what it called a pre-emptive strike of Georgian officials by denying that dozens of Russian peacekeepers were killed during the fighting. Another article in that same paper simply speaks of the 'spin war' having begun: "Russia said the EU-sponsored report recognized that Georgia had started the war. Georgian officials said it blamed Russia for escalating tensions. "
European Union, United States and Global Governance Major Trends and Challenges 3 - 4 December 2009 Brussels (Belgium)
With the support of the European Commission Directorate-General for External Relations Relations with the US and Canada
Call for Papers
Papers are intended to:
Stimulate ground-breaking discussions on major trends and challenges which both EU and US governments and societies are facing. The focus of the Transatlantic Strategy Forum is on the following policy fields: (i) peace and security, (ii) human rights and rule of law, (iii) energy, (iv) climate change, (v) migration, and (vi) trade and political economy.
Include comparative analyses of EU and US policies, as well as policy recommendations on how to forge a transatlantic response to common challenges.
If possible, scrutinise the prospects for global governance of these challenges. Specific attention should be given to how the European Union and the United States can jointly contribute to global solutions.
Who can apply?
The Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies welcomes papers from academics, think tanks, civil society organizations, EU (both Member States and EU-institutions) and US government representatives, EU and US politicians, corporate leaders, and other relevant experts. There are no registration fees.
Submission of proposals
Proposals for paper presentations (in English, containing contact details and an abstract not exceeding 300 words) should be sent as an email attachment to Dr. Steven Sterkx (steven.sterkx@ggs.kuleuven.be). Deadline for proposal submissions is 30 September 2009. The proposals will be reviewed and selected for presentation at the Forum. Notification of acceptance of the paper will follow at the latest by 14 October 2009. Papers (in English) are to be submitted by 22 November 2009, and should be limited to maximum 5000 words.
An interesting article appeared today on the Euractiv network. With the working assumption that the Lisbon Treaty will soon come into force after the October 2 referendum in Ireland (which is not all that sure anymore if one follows the latest polls), the buzz is on for whom will become EU president, and which top politician will become the new double-hatted (Commission & Council) chief of EU external relations. The article on Euractiv reports that Poland refuses to support the former Finnish Prime Minister Lipponen as candidate to that position "on the grounds that he works for Gazprom on the Nord Stream pipeline project". A few paragraphs from that article:
"Former Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen has indeed been working since August 2008 as a consultant for Gazprom on Nord Stream project, a planned natural gas pipeline travelling 1,220 kilometres between Vyborg, Russia and Greifswald, Germany under the Baltic Sea.
The project is considered controversial in several countries, especially Poland, Sweden and the Baltic states. However, Germany is strongly in favour of the pipeline, which in fact is considered "a project of EU interest"
According to the Polish government, the investment threatens state security, because it affects negatively the transit and supply of raw natural gas pipeline 'Yamal' and 'Brotherhood' and presents an ecological threat.
...
The shareholders in Nord Stream are Gazprom (51%), BASF/Wintershall Holding AG (20%), E.ON Ruhrgas AG (20%) and N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie (9%). France's GDF Suez is also reportedly joining (EurActiv 30/07/09).
Polish press agency PAP reported that Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk had explained his position to his Swedish counterpart, Fredrik Reinfeldt (who currently holds the EU's rotating presidency), during commemorations of the outbreak of World War II in northern Poland last weekend."
Personally, I do accept the Polish objections, although for somewhat different reasons. The Nord Stream project has in Polish circles often been likened to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and while surely that comparison is 'a bridge too far' - being on Nord Stream's payroll (just like Gerhard Schroder) doesn't bode well for someone who ought to represent an 'EU' foreign policy. The quoted article states that Nord Stream is 'in the EU interest', but that is partially how it has been 'spun'. Evidently it would be in the EU's interest if the motor of the European economy is well provided with energy (Germany), but the way the project has been executed is a far-cry from a 'common European interest'. In no way has this project been decided upon at a European level, but it is very much the result of an intergovernmental way of dealing with the Russian federation. Now, given Germany's historical close trade links with Russia (and Schroder's friendship with Putin - and Putin and Barosso's mutual dislike) that should come as no surprise. However, in my (somewhat utopian) view, the EU foreign policy chief should come with a background that 'speaking with a single voice' is actually a good thing, and with an ability to think beyond national interests. In that sense then, I do think that Poland makes a good point when it says that being connected to a deal that obviously flows from national energy giant & member state interests rather than an 'EU interest', is at the very least a yellow card in applying for that particular EU top job.
The EU in the world: external relations law for the 21st century
Friday 2 October 2009, T.M.C. Asser InstituUt (The Hague)
Programme (draft)
09:30 – 10:00 Registration, coffee/tea 10:00 – 10:05 Welcome (Prof. M. Scheltema, confirmed) 10:05 – 10:15 Opening and introduction to CLEER (Dr. S. Blockmans, confirmed)
10:15 – 10:45 EU external relations in the post-Lisbon era (Prof. J.C. Piris, confirmed) 10:45 – 11:00 Discussant (Prof. D. Curtin, confirmed) 11:00 – 11:15 Discussion
11:15 – 11:45 Coup d’états? Intergovernmentalising external relations law (Prof. P. Koutrakos, invited) 11:45 – 12:00 Discussant (Prof. B. Martenczuk, confirmed) 12:00 – 12:30 Discussion
12:30 – 13:30 Lunch
13:30 – 14:00 Exporting EU law: ensuring homogeneity in diversity (Dr A. Łazowski, confirmed) 14:00 – 14:15 Discussant (Dr. G. de Baere, confirmed) 14:15 – 14:45 Discussion
14:45 – 15:15 Cross-fertilisation? Public international law and EU law (Prof J. Wouters, invited) 15:15 – 15:30 Discussant (Prof. P.J. Kuijper, confirmed) 15:30 – 15.45 Discussion
15:45 – 16:00 Coffee/tea
Launching the Centre for EU External Relations (CLEER)
16.00 – 16:30 The EU contribution to global stability and prosperity (H.E. F. Timmermans, tbc) 16:30 – 17:00 Discussion 17:00 – 17:10 Future planning of CLEER (Dr. S. Blockmans, confirmed) 17:10 – 17:15 Closing and reception
17.15 – 18.30 Reception
You are kindly invited to participate. Registration is required because we have room for 80 participants only.
It's August, with a hernia, so there has been a lot of time to catch up on some reading!
This post is about a book I picked up in Dutch (also available in French): Riccardo Petrella's 'Human Desire - The Right to Dream'. The reason to pick up this book was quite simple: over the past few years I seem to have mainly been exposed to political ideas which one way or the other are connected to liberalism: from libertarian ideas (with which I thoroughly disagree) to social liberal ideas which seem sometimes indistinguishable form social democrat's ideas. So, in the never-ending quest for political identity, I thought to read some work clearly associated with the left side of the political spectrum. This mainly because I wanted to be more intimately familiar with the intellectual underpinning of 'different-globalists'. (That is the term these days?) A quick word on the author: he is a professor at the Université catholique de Louvain. He chaired the Group of Lisbon, a kind of think-tank which in 1994 published the book 'the limits of competition', which counters the free market as a system regulating distribution among human beings because billions of people cannot participate. I copied this info from the following page, where more is available: click here for page (in dutch)
Now, it's clear that Mr. Petrella's heart is in the right place, and one can but agree with the claim that friendship and solidarity are important, as is the right to dream of a better world (the core premise of the book). However, this work is projected as the scientific underpinning for the project of 'a different global world', and from that perspective I have found the book disappointingly meager: In a very profound way, I was disappointed for its lack of systematization of the argument and lack of definition in what is in essence an essay on his theory of justice. What follows are some thoughts on my core quarrels with the substance of his work, but first a brief word on the structure of the book:
The book is composed as follows: First, he outlines what is meant with the right to dream, and the fact that ‘the establishment’ has deprived people of that right.In the next part he then argues that in the world today, dreams of wealth and power are prevalent.I will not focus all too much on that part.Given that the book was written in 2005, it reflects that anti-American zeitgeist of different-globalists under the Bush presidency.That part regularly refers to the pan-European protests against the Iraq war as the people’s expression of their dream of a different world. (Protests in which I actually participated when I was still a student in Ghent. – just to make sure I don’t come across as a hard-core cynic J) Anyway, the book then continues with expanding it’s own dreams: that of justice, that of a different economy, that of world peace, and that of democracy.The conclusion is an invitation on how to achieve that goal, with some propositions on education, etcetera.
Some of my quarrels with this book:
1. At the core of his work lies an insufficiently defined concept of justice and instead the propositions it makes are based on empathic claims rather than a true alternative to liberalism. Petrella all too often refers to the need for more solidarity among people, for more security, and for ‘saying hello to each other’. (I mean no disrespect with this quote, but it comes back regularly.)His proposals for change are hence not theoretically substantiated, but rather underpinned by such references as pharma-companies refusing to provide AIDS medicine to South-African people, or the fact that millions lack access to clean water.Now, in a first spur of indignation those are occurrences which ought to cause indignation in any decent and compassionate human being, and in that sense is a strong rallying cry for change in the global system of politics, economy and law; but populism is insufficient and undesirable for the intellectual underpinning of a 21st century different-globalist movement. What is more, I find it rather dangerous, especially given the propositions that follow in the book.
2.Petrella proposes various things as part of his dream of a different world, a few include: to found new institutions on a global scale, to make poverty illegal, to make war illegal, to write new economic rules, to have participative democracy on a grand scale, and so on.
3. On the first issue, the problem is that the author proposes that there is such a thing as public goods, which oughtnot be part of the market since that leads to an unjust distribution.(In essence, this proposition is a radical view on the UNDP’s initiatives on public goods.)For example, one such public good is scientific knowledge which ought to belong to humanity as a whole (hence the pharma-company reference).Aside from the obvious argument about incentive for innovation if no reward is available, the problem is that the global institutions he proposes to set up to manage such goods, are but empty shells.Without a clear underpinning of the concept of justice those institutions would use as a yardstick, things like a ‘world human forum’ are simple meaningless attempts at central planning on a global scale.A call for public goods to be administered ‘in a more just fashion’ than is currently the case is no guarantee where it invites greed, corruption, and tyranny. (and the book never gets further than defining just distribution in terms of solidarity, a woefully circular reasoning) Anyway, the 20th century experiment in central planning and organisation for a broadly defined common good has sufficiently proven that point.
4. Declaring poverty illegal is a senseless proposition.For this I can quite easily refer to the post below, on critical legal studies.Koskenniemi and others (David Kennedy, Philip Allott, etc.) have sufficiently pointed to the emptiness of such arguments.Petrella defines poverty in terms of being deprived of ‘social human rights’ such as right to health care, education, water, etc.Aside from the fact that human rights are firmly embedded in the liberal political theory on which international relations are based, making a call to law is an unfounded change in argumentative structure: making something illegal gives no added value to the argument and is purely semantic.
5. Peace is projected as a universal public good and as an example he takes the achievement of peace between Germany and France as a wonderful thing. However, he makes no reference to how such came about, especially given that peace on the European continent is at least partially the result of large-scale economic integration and liberalisation of markets across country borders.That happens to be the core sulphur-imbued enemy of the book, which he proposes ought to be replaced by a system of public-cooperative-private goods. Hence, what if economic integration is indeed key to peace?Not including a refutation of a similarly formulated question is a central problem with this book, especially in its aspiration to present a coherent argument formulating an alternative to the current political and economic system.
I do want to conclude on a more positive note.The injustices in the world it criticizes are very much prevalent:Water is becoming scarcer by the day, and the North – South divide is a fact. Furthermore, the points he makes on excess consumption and debt in 2005 have become all the more relevant since 2008. However, if this book is part of the scientific underpinning of different-globalism, it is disappointing.The book is mostly a mixture of events which most reasonable and well-socialised people with some compassion would think are ‘unjust’.This kind of ‘intuitive justice’ is then blended with unsubstantiated claims on a fundamental shift in society.What I found then most disturbing, is that the book seemed to imply that if one criticizes the different-globalist project, one is part of the establishment, and one is stealing the common person’s right to dream.
Well, in exploring my own dream of a better world I will certainly continue my 'quest' of exploring the political spectrum both right and left.No doubt I will post some more thoughts at regular intervals, and currently underway from amazon are two more books:
- Social Justice in the LiberalState, by Bruce Ackerman
- The Idea of Justice, by Amartya Sen
On a very different side-note, I recently also ordered two more leisurely books: the world atlas of wine and a cook's guide to herbs and spices, I can highly recommended both of them!
The first time I heard Martti Koskenniemi speak was in 2003 when I attended the Hague academy of international law. (The general course was given by judge Bedjaoui.- with quite a different project.) Koskenniemi was an inspiring speaker and teacher, and in my view is one of international law's great contemporaries. This post is a brief reflection on one of his seminal writings: 'From Apology to Utopia - The structure of international legal argument'. The book was published in 1989, and because of its importance reissued in 2005 with Cambridge university press. The past week I have been forced to do nothing but lie down, because of a shifted intervertebral disc. A painful affair, but the silver lining is that it gave me the time to finally go through this book in one, concentrated go. I can highly recommend doing so, and for anyone with even a remote interest in international law or international relations, this book is a must-read:
The insight offered by this work is at first unnerving and at times viciously stinging, until one comes to understand its significance for the scholar, diplomat, politician,: The lawyer must realize that objectivity in law does not exist and “that they – as well as Statesmen – must take seriously the moral-political choices they are faced with even when arguing ‘within the law’ and accept the consequence that in some relevant sense the choices are theirs and that they therefore should be responsible for them.” The consequences of the normative-critical project are negative and positive: On the one hand it strips any legal argument of its professed objectivity and implied superiority over political argument. On the other hand it seeks to construct an identity of the lawyer as a social actor who recognizes conflict in society, and through a process of open-dialogue seeks the most appropriate solution to a concrete problem in law and society. In this sense, the book explicitly states it concerns the 'integrity of the lawyer.'
As a consequence, in focusing not just on international law but on the structure of its argument, the book is more about the legal profession in general, and in that sense, I find the insights offered by this book a crucial tool, a license if you will, to do the lawyer's job. An explicit recognition that our thinking on legal rules shifts between formalism and ideology, between the concrete and the normative, between apology and utopia, is an essential insight that leads not to nihilism, but in my view enriches what lawyers do. This because reading this book ought to have as a consequence an introspection on one's own objectives in the legal profession: an integrity which flows from the realization that subjectivity lies not just on the margins of law but is embedded in its deep-structure, combined with an awareness of one's own ideological preferences. That is - for what it's worth - my reading of it.
About a week ago, Swedish think-tank Timbro published a report entitled "The European Union's Burden - Information and Communication to a reluctant people." (Link) According to a Eurativ.com article this report has received much media-attention in the country of the current EU presidency, prompting Margot Wallström to publish a rebuttal yesterday, which can be found here. The report is in English, and the Commissioner's response is in Swedish.
The arguments espoused in this report are quite 'Euroskeptic' with such statements as 'colonizing civil society' or 'imposing a common identity' for the purpose of furthering European integration. While I consider myself a Europhile committed to a critical reading of European integration, this report does not merit the attention it has received. (For me, a critical europhile entails that subsidiarity is to be taken seriously and that European integration does not imply 'communautarization') I found that the report is but a random collection of which media channels are being funded by the Union, to which then some random insights from political science are added to argue that EU communication strategy amounts to propaganda. Of course, an objective observer could find that I'm simply on the other side of the tug-of-war, and equally subjective. Maybe, but on the substance of the argument the report is nevertheless flawed. So what I'll do is simply list some of their arguments which I found quite striking, while briefly adding some thoughts and rebuttals which may be given (by Europhiles?). :-)
They argue that EU communication strategy is a clear reflection of a core finding of the public choice school, which states that public officials will see their status and influence increase as the burocracy for which he/she works expands. (p21) Similarly, they quote the recent work 'the EU institutions as an interest group' from which they add the following quote "As soon as a new organization sees the light of the day, it struggle to secure its survival and growth. Political and economic events that previously would have been inconsequential are now exploited by the newborn organization to obtain more staff, more funding and more competencies." Surely that is a pertinent comment, and one should indeed be critical of some of the institutions’ actions. For example, in some of my own work I have written on the development of EU aviation policy, where the Commission followed a clear judicial strategy to leverage a competence dispute with the member states. Before the Court, the Belgian Government had submitted that “the bringing of the present action constitutes a misuse of procedure because the Commission is attempting, by that means, to secure a Community competence for which it was unable to obtain recognition at the level of the Council, and which it can secure only by taking action against that institution”.[C-471/98, Com v. Belgium, para 36]
While I would not judge the Commission’s strategy wholly negative in this case, it underlines a pertinent point in this report which ought not be ignored.Nevertheless, using this argument following a long list of ‘Euronews receives X million euros; Youth in Action receives X million, and so on’, is quite inadequate in my opinion.First of all, blaming the “EU institutions” for all that one finds wrong about European Integration is rather simplistic for it ignores the simple fact that the Council is the Member States, that the European Council has gained much traction over the past few years, and that the Commission’s legislative initiative is in practice quite limited because of the shift in the EU’s institutional balance with Parliament having become much more important.I find this mainly pertinent when the report states “And by what right the EU considers itself able to seek cooperation with European news media and ask them to pass on political message?” Second, I see no immediate connection between the usual ‘size of the European burocracy’-argument (and the Commission is not that big anyway with its 20000 officials) and stating that EU communication is EU integration-propaganda.
When the report argues that EU communications strategy amounts to propaganda, I find that it is quite dishonest in what it is actually discussing.The report is not so much critiquing the EU’s news-channels and dealing with its approach to media, but rather perceiving the whole gamut of EU policies is seen through a Euroskeptic prism.The previous example of supporting youth actions is therefore judged as ‘indoctrinating our youths’ and argues that “The overall trend is clear. The whole of the EU communicates with a desire to constantly emphasize cooperation alleged positive aspects. You get almost the feeling that the EU is more about advocating a particular political message than to simplify cross-border cooperation.” (p10.) That, in my opinion, is rather their interpretation of the Union as a whole. For example, two paragraphs before the quoted text, they mention that the Court of Auditors is very critical of how money in EU cohesion policy has been spent. While in itself that point is very valuable, and EU money is being thrown about in many-a-policy, meriting deep and critical monitoring, such is more a simplistic “EU is bad” argument than an objective observation on EU communication strategies.
While I could go on, and on, and on about this report, in essence, I feel that it’s subtitle is quite deceitful. It is not about examining “information and communication to a reluctant people”, but rather a grouping of reluctant people (the think-tank) publishing with much fanfare a collection of previously known arguments which together make little sense.Shall we question the whole of European integration? Fine, let’s. (See first post on this blog.) Shall we question the common agricultural policy? Fine, let us do that. Shall we question the effectiveness of EU external relations? Fine as well. As a critical Europhile I am most willing to engage the excesses and problems of European integration, but not if it edges on populism.
On 15-16 September 2009 there will be a conference on 'Complementarity and the ICC - from theory to practice', held at the peace palace in the Hague. It includes big names such as Luis Moreno Ocampo, but there is also a call for papers on the conference topic. Abstracts and resumes are to be sent by August 21st. This is the link.
Here is a link to an interesting article to last week's newsletter of the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. It provides a useful - although somewhat crude - view on the Azerbaijani position to the Euro-Russian geopolitical game in the energy sphere. Click here for article.
In relation to the two blogposts of today and yesterday, here is an interesting article in Russian calling the signature today of the Nabucco agreement 'a black day for South Stream'. Here is the link. Google translate does a great job on this.
Here's also a link to Barosso's speech today. Somewhat emotional, but why not on an obviously sunny day for a troubled project: "Gas pipes may be made of steel, but Nabucco can cement the links between our people."
Today's signature of the international agreement on the Nabucco pipeline on which I blogged yesterday is catching headlines today: see for the articles on EU observer and BBC news. Note in those articles, and in my own blogpost, that the persistent theme of worry regarding this project is the lack of commitments to actually fill the pipeline. Sure, Iran is very much interested, but obvious geopolitical reasons make Europe somewhat reluctant. Hence Europe is strongly looking towards the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia to provide this project with the necessary hydrocarbons to make the project a success.
What has gone unreported is something plucked from Russian media, and I owe thanks again to my fiance for pointing this article out to me. Today it was reported on gazeta.ru that Turkmenistan President Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov said last friday - following a cabinet meeting - that "Turkmenistan is committed to the principles of diversification of its energy output to world markets, and intends to utilize available opportunities to participate in major international projects - such, for example, project Nabucco" This evolution is part of broader energy relations between Turkmenistan and Russia having deteriorated over the last few months, with Gazprom decreasing and even stopping the purchase of Turkmen gas last april. While the commitment of Turkmenistan is good news for the EU's project, it is of course part of the bigger game that is being played: First, much of Turkmen gas is being delivered to China, used for its own consumption, and most of the rest has been contracted out to Gazprom. While Turkmenistan has huge confirmed reserves, many of them require significant investment is unlikely to be finished by 2014 (the time when Nabucco would start providing gas to the EU). Hence, as far as political statements go it is important, but would need much more concretization. Second, Russian experts quoted by gazeta.ru state that this is mostly to pressure Russia into purchasing its own gas (at a better price), undoubtedly a valid point. Hence, all in all this is a significant statement from Turkmenistan, to the benefit of Nabucco, but given the close existing ties between Moscow and the central-Asian countries, and the many financial, technical, and political burdens ahead, gas flowing through Nabucco in 2014 is far from certain.
My doctoral thesis examines the European Neighbourhood Policy as a 'coherent', or 'single' policy of the European Union [chuckle?]; and while working on this topic EU energy policy has increasingly become somewhat of a hobby horse of mine. In an EUI working paper (available here) I have provided some quantitative material to show that the EU is relatively successful in energy policy with Azerbaijan, and has with some success brought energy security issues, climate change, market & competition issues, etc comprehensively together in dealing with this third country. That is not to say that there are no problems, there are: EU energy policy is certainly not new, and the Commission has for years been hammering away at the completion of the internal market. The external dimension of energy policy is more recent and still faces numerous teething troubles, not in the least the fragmented dealings of the Member States with producer countries (which may be in their national interests but sometimes counter 'EU' interests) and parallel attempts of the Union (mostly guided by DG TREN and strongly backed by Solana) to further a common EU energy policy. The Nabucco pipeline agreement to be signed tomorrow is certainly an interesting case for political scientists and lawyers alike, and two points in particular:
First, how it came about: the project is concluded between four member states and Turkey, to further connect to the gas fields of notably Azerbaijan, Iran and the Central Asian countries. From the perspective of an EU energy policy it is then interesting that the Commission was central to these negotiations as a facilitator, a problem solver, ... bringing together the various parties in negotiations which have gone on for about six months. It is an example of very effective collaboration between the Member States and the Commission in an area where both are competent, and goes to show that division of competence (who does what in the EU, the Member States or the Institutions) can be easily overcome if the will to do so exists.
Second, I am certainly enthusiastic that this project is finally becoming more tangible and construction should start in 2011, and gas should flow from 2014 onwards. That's the plan at least: the question remains whether the EU will manage to find sufficient contacts to fill this pipeline? One significant failure of EU policy occurred two weeks ago, and goes to show what happens if the Member States and the EU institutions do not collaborate effectively. I have not found a source in English media, but it was widely reported in Azerbaijan itself: two weeks ago, President Medvedev and President Aliyev of Azerbaijan signed a significant deal on deliveries to Russia from Azerbaijan's Shaz Deniz gas field. A huge blow to the Nabucco project, and the result of the sluggishness of the EU in dealing with this country. The funny thing of course, Russia is simply acquiring this gas to resell it to Europe as part of it's strategy to control all inflows into the EU-27. Similarly, also a few weeks ago, Russia and Nigeria signed a significant oil deal, equally detrimental in the ability of EU of securing energy not directly or indirectly controlled by Gazprom/Russia.
In sum, it is significant that this agreement is signed, but the EU has much to do if it is to have a true common EU energy policy. The agreement is not yet publicized, but I intend to do a more comprehensive post once its contents is known.
Today and tomorrow - 6 and 7 July - the US president is visiting Russia in what is a second encounter between him and his Russian counterpart since the London G20 summit.I read on the BBC website that in Russia the importance of this visit is being downplayed as rather low-key.Now, I’m getting increasingly disappointed in BBC’s reporting on Russia as being generally oblivious of what is actually going on in that country. For example,I recall them reporting on the economic crisis, and the interviews with ‘normal Russians’ were all people from Moscow with sufficient savings to last out at least six months without a job without having to change living habits. Hardly a representative sample of common people who are hard-hit by the global downturn. So no, it is not being downplayed in Russian media as insignificant, but is instead generally viewed as quite successful. [Click here for one article.] Myself, I would share that positive assessment, a few thoughts on today's events:
A few hours ago was the press conference held at the Kremlin after wrapping up the first day of talks, and I found it an interesting and relatively open briefing.Evidently all in diplomatic language, but one could make no mistake of the differences between the two countries, as well as the progress made.One thing struck me, namely that they agreed to found what was called by Obama ‘presidential institutions’.Now, I’m not too sure whether I got that name right, but what I did understand is that they set up a new – expert level institutional framework much like the EU – Russia common spaces.These institutions will be divided according to subject, covering various topical issues such as energy, health, civil society, business, etc.In the EU that institutional framework has always provided an important structure through which to conduct external relations, (lthough Patten was also skeptical, and rightly so. Still, think it is a significant normalisation of Russia – US relations that such institutions will be set up, especially because they also go far beyond ad hoc cooperation on high profile, contentious political issues. Such structured relations will do much to bring the two countries together, since only regular and long-term contacts can bring two peoples together. They will be administer by Secretary of State Clinton.
An interesting question in the briefing came from the Associated Press journalist, who asked whether there is full trust between the presidents, and addressing Obama: “whether you have settled in your mind who is in charge, Putin or Medvedev?”Well,we know that before Obama came to Russia, he had said that Putin still lived with one foot in the past, an obvious reference to his KGB pre-history and subsequent political course.In Russian media this was a point which was widely reported as Obama seeking to draw a wedge between Putin and Medvedev, and I was therefore quite interested in seeing Obama’s response.He essentially said that “Medvedev is interested in both Russian interests and American interests, and yes, I trust him to follow through on agreements attained here today. The short timeframe between London meeting and now, and what has been accomplished in this short period, are good signs for progress in the future.” Responding to the Putin question: “Tomorrow I will have breakfast with Putin, I have not met him. My understanding is that Medvedev is president, Putin is prime minister. Power is allocated according to their form of government, my interest is to work with my own counterpart and to reach out to all influential forces in Russia society to get a full picture of Russian needs. My strong impression is that they work effectively together, our interest is to deal with Russian government as a whole.” Skilful choice of words if you ask me! Especially since this response seemed to have been received quite positively by Russian media as well, where it has been translated as Obama saying that he respects the 'division of powers as laid down in the constitution.' Whatever Obama might really think, or what is said in CIA briefings, he showed himself a skilful diplomat!
Much of the press conference went to the follow-up to Start I which will expire at the end of this year, and it was reported that there was an agreement to significantly reduce the quantity of nuclear arms.That is significant, although it is common knowledge that both countries struggle to finance and maintain their tens of thousands of warheads.The issue of Iran came up, as did the anti-missile shield which has stirred up so much dust during the Bush era.If found it notable that Obama pointed explicitly to North Korea and Iran as being the strategic targets of a defensive anti-missle capability, stating that “the nuclear capacity of Russia was too robust anyway”.This is important especially if one recall two recent developments in relation to Iran, first, the fact that Vice-president Biden said on ABC news that the US would not be able to intervene if a sovereign Israel decided to intervene in Iran; and second, that while Obama offered to talk with Iran to improve relations, that since the recent which took place after that offer, it seems rather hollow, and at least in my assessment the US’ position has hardened. We should not forget that the US has its own internal ultimatum of ‘resolving’ the Iran nuclear issue by the end of this year.Anyway, back to the summit itself.On the issue of the missile shield, Obama also hinted that it was a matter of conditionality.I don’t recall literally what the US president said, but it went something like this: ‘If Russia would sufficiently agree to reduce their nuclear offensive capability, then the US would be much more open towards Russian concerns over the missile shield.’
Another point which I found significant was the agreement to use Russian airspace to airlift material towards the combat effort in Afghanistan.First, I read this as recognition that Russia’s interests are aligned with those of NATO in the region.In itself it is of course self-evident that Russia has no interest in an unstable major drug exporter on its borders.However, allowing flights of a military nature to support a NATO effort is significant.Second, it reminded me of the excruciatingly long negotiations the EU conducted on allowing civil flights over Siberia which would allow flights to Asia for European carriers.Those were tough negotiations, and I found it again significant that Russia would agree to these kinds of flights as well.All small steps towards improved relations.
The Georgia issue was also raised during the press conference, and there Obama simply reiterated the commitment to Georgia’s sovereignty, while recognizing that further violence should be avoided.I suppose that this issue was not really discussed during the three hour meeting, as one would assume that this would be too contentious to resolve in what was already a summit with a very full agenda.
Broadly, I found this summit a success.The tone of the press conference was not to be misunderstood at times, but as an optimist I prefer to look at the positive signals and consider it an important step in the revitalization of a relationship that had slid back close to the Cold War era. This is good for US – Russia relations, this is good for EU – US – Russia relations, and this is good for the world.
3 July Update:I have been scouring various media, the presidency website, the Council, etc. and no news so far. I suppose they are difficult negotiations.
5 July Update on the post below:No news is good news? No news is bad news? Either way, it seems that rather than not speaking with a single voice the current option is to not speak at all. On the issue of a response to the disqualification from nuclear talks: I've talked to someone from Parliament and we shouldn't expect any EU action on Iran before early August. On the issue of the embassy members taken captive: Today it was reported by David Millibandthat one of the two remaining captives will be released in the coming days. One could easily imagine that hour-to-hour negotiations were ongoing since July 1st, and that by the Thursday/Friday meetings it was no longer expedient to react so strongly by pulling back other EU countries' diplomats so as to avoid disrupting these negotiations. Maybe that's just the Europhile in me speculating though... and they simply could not agree on a common line of action.
Yesterday July 1st, Iran's military chief of staff said that the EU is no longer welcome at the table where Iran's nuclear developments were being discussed, following its alleged involvement in stirring up post-Election protests. Today the new Swedish Presidency has called the European ministers together to discuss a response to this new development. The United Kingdom requests strong action given that 9 of its embassy staff had been arrested on accusations of stirring up unrest over the past weeks. Notably, it insists that all EU member states call back their ambassadors, which indeed would be a strong response on the part of the Union. However, Germany and France are not keen on doing so, wishing to keep diplomatic channels open. According to EUobserver, their reason for doing so is the significant trade relationship which exists between those two EU member states and Iran.
In this sense this is an interesting and high-profile test case for the Union's common foreign and security policy, and I look forward to the outcome of this meeting later today. I will update this post when the results of the meeting are made public.
Yearly in April, Zagreb University holds a one-week seminar on advanced issues of European law at the Inter-university center in Dubrovnik. The presentations are given both by doctoral level students as well as professors, and are all of good quality. Having participated this year I can highly recommend it! Next year's website is up and will cover "Market Freedoms & Human Rights in an Enlarging EU"
The application deadline is 15 January 2010.
The image to the left is a view from the classroom on Dubrovnik's old city centre.
Surely we have all been closely following events unfold in Iran. As protests grew grimmer, and terrible pictures of victims of the harsh crackdown emerged, so did various questions as to the exact nature and meaning of all of this? I too, was shocked by the youtube video of the 27-year old girl Neda who, according to the NY times, got shot while coming back from singing lessons. Let's hope her and other deaths will not have been in vain. Standing back a little bit, it is also necessary to look at the bigger picture of the way we get our information from mainstream media. While information on the situation is scarce, what I have found to be equally lacking is proper and self-critical analysis in the media - on the role of the media: e.g. a nuanced picture of what may and may not be true in the 24-hour newscycle, and what it means if trusted news-sources such as CNN, NYtimes, BBC, etc regularly post articles containing mostly youtube links and twitter quotes. While certainly not diminishing the strength of Iran's security apparatus, I miss that analysis, but did find a post raising the right questions on the IntLawGrrls blog: 'Ahmadinejad a Persian Nixon?'I thought their analysis was highly pertinent when it stated that the right to self-determination means that one ought to be able to chose one's leaders without fraud, but also without outside interference. I raise the point here because it is not about simply buying into numerous conspiracy theories which are out there on the internet, (concerted effort by MI-6, Mossad and the CIA is one of those.) but rather about asking the right questions in a serene debate: Are we being manipulated, or are they? (Or both?) What is true and what is not? What is created through repetition and what is not? And so on, and so forth.
This post is a joint effort between myself and my fiancee Ksenia, and tries to give some insight into recent developments in EU-Russia-Belorussian relations. Links and translations are entirely to her credit, and analyses are the result of our joint discussions. Ksenia is an expert in political economy and international relations, her doctoral thesis studies US influence on energy trade during the Cold War. Please contact me for her email address, which I do not post here to avoid spam.
On this blog I've previously discussed the Eastern Partnership summit of early May 2009. What was notable in this upgrade in political and economic relations under the umbrella of the European Neighbourhood Policy, was that it included previously excluded Belarus. In a press conference on 6 May 2009 Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov 'expressed hopes that this initiative would not lead to a choice between either you're with Russia, or you're with the EU'. While he made these remarks following a meeting with the Polish foreign minister (a country with strong interests in the Eastern Partnership), nevertheless it seems that Russia - Belarus relations are very much souring, at least in part because of Belarus' recent turn to the European Union. I thought I'd put some news from the Russian side on this blog, since such ongoing events are generally absent in mainstream European media.
Some days ago, Russian Head of Sanitary Inspection Onishenko (comparable to a Health Minister, but Russia has a minister of social development Golikova) prohibited the import of Belarussian dairy products (mostly milk powder), apparently on the basis that this milk lacks the proper labeling on its packaging. Now, that technical requirement was only the issue at the outset, because in a recent article (15 june 2009) the issue is projected more of an anti-dumping dispute protecting Russian farmers who can no longer compete with Belarussian farmers. Whether that is true I leave in the middle, but since the economic crisis Russia has strongly embarked on protectionist policies: European flat screen TV's; Japanese and European cars; and so on. What is notable according to Ksenia, is the parallel with the 2007 dispute between Russia and Georgia, where the former refused to import mineral water and red wine from the latter country, over - you guessed it - labeling issues. This cut off a significant export from Georgia to one of its main trading partners. The parallel goes of course further, and according to Russian commentators the Dairy dispute is in turn an immediate consequence of Belarus' refusal to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Whatever the exact explanation, the future impact of this dispute is interesting as it occurs concurrently with last Sunday's meeting (14 June 2009) the Collective Security Treaty Organization (own translation) between Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Armenia and Uzbekistan. In February 2009 an agreement had been reached between these countries on the creation of a rapid reaction force between these countries, and this agreement would now be signed at the septilateral summit in Moscow. (A meeting which in Russian media is being construed as linked to countenancing the recent NATO manoevres in Georgia close to the disputed regions in that country.)
As a consequence of this dairy dispute (or what Russian media calls the 'dairy hysteria'), the Belarussian president Lukashenko decided to boycott the Moscow summit. According to Belarus, it refuses to attend a regional security organisation where one of its members clearly violates the economic security of another member, and it also questions the legitimacy of such a rapid reaction force. Not having been personally called up by Lukashenko, President Medvedev was apparently thoroughly offended at the hysteric reaction of Minsk. The consequences are twofold: First, in Russian media Belarus is increasingly being painted no longer as the long-standing ally of Russia, but as a disloyal disciple of this country. Secondly, looming on the horizon is a new energy conflict.
As for the first, it is clear that in all of this, Lukashenko is being characterised as an oddball, much like the picture painted of Saakaashvilii during the mid-2008 conflict. Take notably this article, where Lukashenko is quoted as calling a high ranking russian official 'an idiot', and quoted as saying that 'we don't need a Russia with their Western money telling us what to do'. In response, Medvedev and Putin are quoted as stating that such a tone is not acceptable within a family, but that Belarus is still very much a friend and trusted partner.
As for the second issue, this article is certainly interesting. First, a senior Kremlin official is quoted as saying that 'apparently Lukashenko is sick of being president of Belarus', implying that he occupies this position by the grace of Moscow. Second, the magazine 'Kommersant' reports that the Kremlin is apparently preparing a gas attack on Minsk. At the end of May, A. Kuznetsov said that it had 'recently been discovered' that Belarus does not pay for its Russian Gas in full. the price for the first quarter (which Belarus pays on a monthly basis) was set at $ 210 per thousand cubic meters, but apparently they only pay $ 150. The debt accumulated that way over the winter of the beginning of this year is about 70 million dollars to Gazprom. However, it seems that in March of 2009, this was not an issue, and Medvedev and Lukashenko had actually agreed that Minsk would pay the average of $ 150 per thousand cubic meters to Moscow, and that this would be even extended to the end of 2009. An agreement, so Kommersant reports, which had not been formalized in writing. This, then, would allow Gazprom to return to previous contractually agreed obligations of 2006, which according to Gazprom representativ Kupriyanov have thus allegedly not been adjusted through the March 2009 agreement. The consequent financial obligations of Minsk to Russia give the latter control over the former, much like the latest conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
All very interesting, and undoubtedly to be continued.
Posts
